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On January 11, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States
decided arguably the most important religious-freedom case in
decades. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
School v. EEOC, the unanimous Court, for the first time, recog-
nized the "ministerial exception" to employment discrimination
laws by holding that churches and other religious organizations
are free to hire and fire their ministerial leaders without govern-
ment interference.1 Although this decision can be viewed as a ma-
jor victory for religious freedom, the Court gave limited guidance
as to who qualifies as a minister. In turn, the future of religious
freedom remains unclear, because the question of who is or is not
significant to the spiritual mission of a religion is still unan-
swered.
Hosanna-Tabor involved a lawsuit brought by Cheryl Perich, a
parochial school teacher employed by Hosanna-Tabor, a church-
operated school belonging to the Lutheran Church-Missouri Syn-
od, the second largest Lutheran denomination in the nation.2
Perich alleged that her employment was terminated in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act.3 The Supreme Court dis-
missed Perich's suit, concluding that, based on the circumstances
of her job, she qualified as a minister, and therefore, the ministe-
rial exception barred her suit.4
Rooted in the First Amendment, the ministerial exception bars
any claim that would limit a religious institution's right to select
who will perform certain spiritual functions.5 Every federal circuit
court, excluding the Federal Circuit, has adopted the ministerial
exception when deciding a discrimination claim involving a reli-
gious organization.' The circuit courts also apply the primary du-
ties test, which scrutinizes an employee's job responsibilities in
1. 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).
2. Id. at 700-01.
3. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.)).
4. Id. at 709-10.
5. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
6. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705; see id. at 705 n.2 (collecting cases).
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order to render him or her "important to the spiritual and pastoral
mission of the church."7
Although the Supreme Court sanctified the ministerial excep-
tion by using a totality of the circumstances approach, it did not
enumerate any type of test for lower courts to follow in the future
when determining who is a minister.' The Court's reluctance to
adopt a rigid test leaves the door open for the lower courts to con-
tinue to use the primary duties test to make this determination.
Thus, the line between church and state is still blurred, because
courts are still free to substitute their secular judgment when de-
termining who is important to the spiritual significance of a reli-
gion.
This comment offers an in-depth discussion of the history and
constitutional justifications of the ministerial exception. It then
explains the circuit courts' approach in applying the primary du-
ties test. After exploring how courts determine who is a minister,
this comment addresses the Supreme Court's decision in Hosanna-
Tabor and analyzes the implications of the Court's refusal to adopt
a test to determine who is a minister. Finally, this comment sug-
gests that courts should abandon the primary duties test and de-
fer to religious organizations' understanding of who qualifies as a
minister.
II. DISCUSSION OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
Supreme Court jurisprudence has long recognized the right of
religious organizations to control their internal affairs under the
Establishment Clause9 and the Free Exercise Clause1 ° of the Unit-
ed States Constitution without government encroachment." In
fact, the Court has always safeguarded the "unquestioned" pre-
rogative of religious organizations to tend to the "ecclesiastical
government of all the individual members, congregations, and of-
ficers within the general association." 2  This religious freedom
7. Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir.
2010); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (4th
Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
8. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.").
10. Id. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof.").
11. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702-04 (citations omitted) ('Controversy between
church and state over religious offices is hardly new.").
12. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728-29 (1871).
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encompasses the power of religious bodies to decide for them-
selves, free from state interference, matters of church governance,
as well as those of faith and doctrine.13 Most importantly, the
Court continuously extends this freedom to religious institutions'
rights to select their own religious leaders.14
All too often, however, this coveted religious freedom to hire or
fire runs afoul of another deeply held American tradition-
eradicating discrimination in employment. Problems with these
two competing interests arise if religious-based institutions dis-
criminate based on sex, race, age, disability, or other statutorily
prohibited criteria. In these instances, churches and religious in-
stitutions avoid liability by claiming an exemption from federal
and state employment discrimination laws under the ministerial
exception. This exception applies to employment discrimination
claims including, but not limited to, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ("Title VII"),15 the Americans with Disability Act
("ADA"), 16 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"),1
7
and the Equal Pay Act.'"
Before the Hosanna-Tabor decision, courts took it upon them-
selves to fashion a constitutional ministerial exception doctrine
that allowed religious organizations a certain degree of deference
in their employment decisions.' 9 Rooted in the First Amendment's
guarantees of religious freedom, this ministerial exception pre-
13. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russia Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S.
94, 116 (1952) (citation omitted) (stating that the Watson decision "radiates . .. a spirit of
freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation,
in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine").
14. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25 (1976); Gonzalez
v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553,
554-55 (5th Cir. 1972) (citations omitted) (applying the ministerial exception to a Title VII
cause of action).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300 (2006); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir.
1999) (citations omitted) (extending the ministerial exception to claims involving the ADA).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006); Minker v. Bait. Annual Conference of the United
Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the maintenance of
an age discrimination claim by a minister against his church would violate the First
Amendment).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006); Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d
1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (applying the ministerial exception to a
minister's Equal Pay Act claim).
19. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705
n.2 (2012) (collecting cases).
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cludes judicial interference in the relationship between a religious
organization and employees who perform religious functions.2 °
A. The Origin-McClure v. Salvation Army
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was the
first federal appellate court to formally announce a ministerial
exception in McClure v. Salvation Army.2" There, the court re-
viewed a Title VII sex discrimination claim brought by Billie B.
McClure, an employee and minister of the Salvation Army.22 As a
threshold matter, the court first determined that Title VII applied,
because the Salvation Army was an employer and McClure was an
employee.23
Having determined that Title VII applied, the court focused on
whether application of the statute violates either of the religion
clauses of the First Amendment.24 In doing so, the court noted
that the relationship between an organized church and its minis-
ters is its lifeblood, because "[tihe minister is the chief instrument
by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose."25The court em-
phasized that matters touching this relationship are of prime ec-
clesiastical concern, including hiring, salary, and place of assign-
ment, as well as the duties that a minister is to perform in fur-
therance of the mission of the church.26 The court also classified
practices dealing with the terms of a minister's calling as basic
and traditional to a religious denomination.27
The court explained that Supreme Court jurisprudence consist-
ently protects religious organizations' freedom to decide for them-
selves, free from state interference, matters of church governance,
as well as faith and doctrine.2" Based on this jurisprudence, the
court concluded that applying Title VII to the employment rela-
tionship between McClure and the Salvation Army would result in
an investigation and review of a religious institution's employ-
ment decisions, which have been proclaimed matters of ecclesias-
20. See Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007) (cita-
tions omitted).
21. 460 F.2d 553.
22. Id. at 554 (citation omitted).
23. Id. at 557.
24. Id. at 558.
25. Id. at 558-59.
26. McClure, 460 F.2d at 559.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 559-60 (citations omitted).
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tical concern.2 9 As a result, the church would not have the "power
to decide, free from state interference, matters of church admin-
istration and government."" Moreover, the court stated that an
investigation and review of a church's employment decisions
would produce the "opposite effect of the separation of church and
State contemplated by the First Amendment."3
Ultimately, the court concluded that applying Title VII in this
case would result in an encroachment by the state into an area of
religious freedom forbidden by the principles of the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.32 The court held that "Congress
did not intend, through the nonspecific wording of the applicable
provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment relationship
between church and minister" and dismissed McClure's com-
plaint.33
B. Spreading the Faith-The Circuit Courts Adopt the Ministeri-
al Exception
Over the next thirty-five years, eleven circuit courts followed
the McClure decision by recognizing the ministerial exception.34
Like McClure, these courts repeatedly emphasized the constitu-
tional imperative of governmental non-interference with the min-
isterial employment decisions of churches.35 Some courts warned
that allowing secular courts to have jurisdiction over ecclesiastical
29. Id. at 560.
30. Id.
31. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560 (citations omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 560-61.
34. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204-10 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted);
Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225-27 (6th Cir. 2007); Petruska v.
Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-09 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); Werft v. Desert Sw.
Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1100-04 (9th Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 702-04 (7th
Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 655-59 (10th Cir.
2002) (citations omitted); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800-
05 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church,
Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1302-04 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); Combs v. Cent. Tex. An-
nual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 348-50 (5th Cir. 1999)
(citations omitted); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461-65 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 362-
63 (8th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). See also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705 (2012).
35. See, e.g., Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006)
(providing that a serious constitutional issue would be presented if Congress stripped away
the ministerial exception and allowed federal courts to decide religion questions).
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cases would inevitably create a two-fold risk of violating the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.36
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
Courts that support the ministerial exception do so under the
idea that a constitutional right to church autonomy exists under
the religion clauses of the First Amendment. Mostly, these courts
argue that the Free Exercise Clause protects this right; however,
other courts have found justification for this right under the Es-
tablishment Clause. 7 Still others, like the Supreme Court in Ho-
sanna-Tabor, find that both religion clauses prohibit government
interference in ecclesiastical decisions.
A. The Free Exercise Clause
Most courts adopting the ministerial exception advise that reli-
gious institutions, like individuals, have the right to decide mat-
ters of faith and doctrine under the Free Exercise Clause. 39 This
right includes the freedom to express religious beliefs, to profess
matters of faith, and to communicate a religious message. °
Courts focusing on the Free Exercise clause recognize that, un-
like an individual who can speak on his or her own behalf, the
church as an institution must retain the right to select its voice.41
A minister serves as the church's representative and voice to the
public. Consequently, courts adhere to the idea that "any re-
striction on the church's right to choose who will carry its spiritual
message infringes upon its free exercise right to profess its be-
liefs."42
These courts also hold that matters of church governance, in-
ternal organization, and restructuring are within a church's free
36. See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1166 (4th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) (stating that applying Title VII to the employment
relationship of a church and a minister gives rise to serious constitutional questions).
37. Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1304 (finding that the application of Title VII to the em-
ployment relationship between a church and its clergy would involve "excessive government
entanglement with religion" as prohibited by the Establishment Clause).
38. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 706.
39. See Petruska, 462 F.3d at 306; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167-68 (citations omitted).
40. Petruska, 462 F.3d at 306.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 306-07.
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exercise rights.43 Courts fear that, by investigating employment
discrimination claims by ministers against their churches, secular
authorities would necessarily intrude into church governance in a
manner that would be inherently coercive." They explain that
this offends the Free Exercise Clause, because churches should be
able to make personnel decisions based on whatever criteria they
feel necessary, and encroaching into these decisions requires a
church to articulate religious justifications for its personnel deci-
sions.45
B. The Establishment Clause
In addition to violating the Free Exercise Clause, some courts
also recognize that applying anti-discrimination statutes to the
employment relationship between a church and its employees
would involve "excessive entanglement with religion as prohibited
by the Establishment Clause."46 Entanglement may be procedural
or substantive.47 Procedural entanglement involves any extensive
or prolonged state interaction with a religious entity. 8 This situa-
tion may arise from a civil lawsuit, because of the "protracted legal
process pitting church and state as adversaries."49 On the other
hand, substantive entanglement involves a state inculcating, en-
dorsing, or dictating religious doctrine.5" In particular, a ban on
substantive entanglement prohibits a court from resolving doctri-
nal disputes or endorsing one religious vision over another.51
Essentially, courts reason that investigation by a government
entity into a church's employment decisions almost always entails
procedural governmental entanglement with the internal man-
43. Id. at 307 (citations omitted).
44. Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006).
45. Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1291 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (citing Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947-49
(9th Cir. 1999)); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir.
2000).
46. Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1304
(11th Cir. 2000) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)).
47. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations
omitted).
48. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1980 (2007) (citation
omitted).
49. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th
Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
50. Corbin, supra note 48, at 1980 (citations omitted).
51. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 311 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
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agement of the church, because secular authorities would be eval-
uating or interpreting religious doctrine.12 Also, the litigation pro-
cess evaluates church documents and records and probes the
"mind of the church in the selection of its ministers."53 After
judgment, questions of compliance may result in continued court
surveillance of the church's polices and decisions. 4
On substantive entanglement concerns, courts warn that a
church's view on whether an individual is suited for a particular
position cannot be replaced by the court's secular judgment with-
out entangling the government in questions of religious doctrine,
polity, and practice.55 As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals pro-
scribed, "a courtroom is not the place to review a church's deter-
mination of 'God's appointed.'"56
Furthermore, courts caution that if a religious employer is or-
dered to reinstate or promote a successful discrimination claim-
ant, this employee would then shape and develop religious doc-
trine.57 Courts advise that granting courts the power to decide
who is chosen for such positions indirectly affects the development
of religious doctrine, which involves excessive entanglement."
IV. THE PRIMARY DUTIES TEST
A. Agreement within the Circuit Courts
While the circuit courts first applied the ministerial exception to
Title VII claims, they worked in unison and extended the excep-
tion to suits under other discrimination laws, including the ADA
and ADEA, as well as the common law. 9 In addition, the circuit
courts soon applied the exception to employees who lacked formal
52. Id. at 311; see also Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th
Cir. 2006).
53. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171 (citations omitted).
54. Id. (citation omitted).
55. Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1304
(11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979)).
56. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1170.
57. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706
(2012) ("According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the
faithful... violates the Establishment Clause...
58. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
59. Id. at 705 (citations omitted); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d
940, 951 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing the ministerial exception to state law causes of action).




ordination.6" The courts also applied the ministerial exception to
employees other than ministers, including an organist,61 a church
press secretary,62 a director of music ministries,63 a hospital em-
64 1566ployee, a choir director,65 and a Catholic seminarian.
For purposes of applying the ministerial exception in these
types of situations, the federal courts grappled with determining
whether a particular church employee not preaching from the pul-
pit should be considered a "minister."67 To determine who quali-
fies as a minister, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals fashioned
the two-prong primary duties test.6 First, the employer must be a
religious institution.69 A religious entity meets this prong if "clear
or obvious religious characteristics" mark its mission.7" For in-
stance, religious affiliated schools, corporations, and hospitals
have come within the meaning of "religious institution."71 Also,
institutions operated by religious groups other than those of the
Christian faith meet this prong.72
The second prong of the primary duties test rests on whether
the employee is a ministerial employee.73 In analyzing this prong,
courts analyze the employee's contributions to the spiritual mis-
sion of the church." Specifically, they focus on whether an em-
ployee's primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith,
church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision
60. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168-69 (citation omitted) (stating that the fact that an asso-
ciate pastor can never be ordained is immaterial).
61. Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 2006).
62. Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003).
63. EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 797 (4th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th
Cir. 1985)).
64. Hollins, 474 F.3d at 224.
65. Starkman v. Evans, 198 F,3d 173, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
66. Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc).
67. Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1291 (citations omitted).
68. Rayburn, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
69. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 778
(6th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (citations omitted).
70. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 778 (citations omitted).
71. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 309-10 (4th
Cir. 2004) (citations omitted) (listing cases that determined that an establishment was a
religious institution for purposes of applying the ministerial exception).
72. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 311 (finding that a predominately Jewish nursing home
qualified as a "religious institution").
73. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 778 (citations omitted).
74. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th
Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
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or participation in religious ritual and worship.75 This analysis
triggers judicial scrutiny of an employee's job duties, as well as an
assessment of the spiritual significance of those duties in relation
to the church's religious mission.76 Application of the ministerial
exception, therefore, hinges on whether the court views the em-
ployee as important or unimportant to the spiritual mission of the
church.
B. The Great Divide in the Circuit Courts
Although the circuit courts agree on the existence of the minis-
terial exception, they sharply disagree as to the legal standards
that control the exception. Some courts treat the exception as an
affirmative defense under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).7 7 Others interpret the exception as jurisdictional under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). 71 Still other courts treat
it as a mandate that discrimination laws do not apply to claims
between ministers and their churches.79
The circuit courts are also conflicted as to the application of the
primary duties test. In fact, when it comes to accepting or reject-
ing this test, the circuit courts are evenly divided.'0 The Third,
Fourth, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeal
believe that the best way to determine who is a minister is to ap-
ply the primary duties test.81 The Second, Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal reject the test as "too rigid." 2 The
First, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal de-
termine who is a minister on a case-by-case basis without enu-
merating any test.
8 3
75. EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted).
76. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801 (citation omitted).
77. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3rd Cir. 2006) (citations omitted);
Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese, 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 1999)
(citations omitted); Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir.
1989) (citations omitted).
78. Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007); Tomic v.
Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
79. Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1302-04
(11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.3d 553, 560 (5th Cir.
1972).
80. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
& Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (No.10-553).
81. Id. at 11.




This lack of uniformity has resulted in conflicting outcomes in
factually indistinguishable cases.8 4 A court applying the primary
duties test may consider an employee's duties to be primarily
secular because of the quantity of time he or she spends on reli-
gious functions, while a court using a qualitative approach may
come to a different result.
V. HOSANNA-TABOR EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH &
SCHOOL V. EEOC
A. Facts
In EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor, it seemed that the United States
Supreme Court was finally going to address the question of who
qualifies as a minister. The case arose from an employment dis-
crimination lawsuit brought against Hosanna-Tabor, a Lutheran-
affiliated school, by one of its teachers, Cheryl Perich.8 Hosanna-
Tabor employs two types of teachers: contract teachers, who are
lay teachers; and call teachers, who focus on religious teachings.86
The church views called teachers as being called to their position
by God through the congregation. 7 "To be eligible to receive a call
from a congregation," a teacher must complete a "colloquy" pro-
gram at a Lutheran college or university.88 Upon completion, the
teacher can be called and receive the title "Minister of Religion,
Commissioned." The Church can rescind a teacher's call "only for
cause by a supermajority vote of the congregation."
89
Hosanna-Tabor hired Perich as a contract teacher, but it desig-
nated her as a call teacher after she completed colloquy classes.9"
As a call teacher, "[sihe taught math, language arts, social studies,
science, gym, art, and music."91 Along with those subjects, she
also taught religion classes four days a week for thirty minutes,
and she attended a chapel service with her class once a week.92
Approximately twice a year, Perich led the chapel service.93 In
84. Id. at 10-11.
85. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 699
(2012).




90. Id. at 700 (internal citations omitted).





addition, she led the class in prayer three times a day for a total of
five or six minutes and engaged in a devotional for five to ten
minutes each morning.94
In June 2004, Perich suddenly became ill and was eventually
diagnosed with narcolpesy.95 Due to her illness, she took a leave of
absence for the 2004-2005 school year and applied for disability.96
On January 27, 2005, Perich informed the school principle, Stacey
Hoeft, that she could return to work the following month once the
medicine stabilized her condition.97 Hoeft responded that the
school had already contracted with a lay teacher to fill Perich's
position for the remainder of the school year and expressed con-
cern that Perich was not capable of returning to the classroom.9"
In the meantime, Hosanna-Tabor's congregation held a meeting
at which school administrators explained that Perich was unlikely
to be physically capable of returning to work that year or the
next.99 In essence, the congregation voted to offer Perich a "peace-
ful release" from her call position, which required the church to
pay a portion of her health insurance premiums in exchange for
Perich's resignation as a called teacher.' °°
When Perich was presented with Hosanna-Tabor's offer, she re-
fused to resign and produced a note from her doctor stating that
she could return to work without restrictions on February 22.0 '
Regardless of this release, the board continued to ask her to resign
and respond to the peaceful release by February 21, 2005.102 On
February 22, 2005, Perich arrived at the school, but she was in-
formed that no job existed for her.0 3 Hoeft asked her to leave, but
she refused to do so without receiving a letter from the school ac-
knowledging that she appeared for work. ' 4
Later that day, Hoeft informed Perich that she would likely be
fired, and Perich expressed that she contacted an attorney and
would assert her legal rights.' 5 Also, the school board sent her
letters describing her conduct as "regrettable" and indicating that
94. Id.
95. Id.
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the board would review the process of rescinding her call based on
her disruptive behavior. °6 The board indicated that Perich had
damaged beyond repair her "working relationship" with Hosanna-
Tabor by "threatening to take legal action."" 7 On April 10, the
congregation rescinded Perich's call and sent her a termination
letter the next day. 0 '
B. Procedural History
Perich filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against
Hosanna-Tabor alleging that the school violated the ADA. °9 After
cross-motions for summary judgment, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary
judgment in favor of Hosanna-Tabor, dismissing the claim.' The
court concluded that it could not inquire into her claims of retalia-
tion because they fell within the ministerial exception of the
ADA.' Perich and the EEOC appealed to the Sixth Circuit. 2
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit recognized the existence of the ministerial exception, but con-
cluded that it did not apply.1 3 In doing so, the two-judge majority
applied a quantity over quality approach to the two-prong primary
duties test to examine the duties of Perich's employment, focusing
on the fact that Perich's duties as a called teacher were identical
to those as a lay teacher."4 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
vacated the district court's order entering summary judgment for
Hosanna-Tabor, and it remanded the case to the district court." 5
Hosanna-Tabor petitioned the Supreme Court, which granted cer-
tiorari. 6
106. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 700 (internal citations omitted).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 701.
110. Id.
111. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701.
112. Id.
113. Id. (citation omitted).
114. Id. at 701-02.
115. Id. at 701.
116. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702.
Ministerial Exception
C. W.D.J.D.-What Did the Justices Do?
Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Roberts began by
noting that "[c]ertain employment discrimination laws authorize
employees who have been wrongfully terminated to sue their em-
ployers for reinstatement and damages." The Chief Justice
framed the issue as "whether the Establishment and Free Exer-
cise Clauses of the First Amendment bar such an action when the
employer is a religious group and the employee is one of the
group's ministers.""7 The Court answered this question in the
affirmative by holding that "[b]oth Religion Clauses bar the gov-
ernment from interfering with the decision of a religious group to
fire one of its ministers."118
The Court began its analysis with an in depth discussion of the
history of religious freedom in England and the United States.'19
In doing so, the Court recognized that "[clontroversy between
church and state over religious offices is hardly new," 2' but the
"scrupulous policy" of the Constitution was to prevent government
intrusion into the internal affairs of religious groups' selection of
their ministers.
121
Turning to whether this religious freedom extends to suits alleg-
ing discrimination, the Court agreed with the court of appeals
and, for the first time, recognized the ministerial exception.122 The
Court emphasized that "members of a religious group put their
faith in the hands of their ministers" and "[riequiring a church to
accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for
failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment deci-
sion."123 The Court went on to explain that such action interferes
with church governance and deprives the church of control over
selecting who will exemplify its beliefs, violating both of the reli-
gion clauses.'
24
Having recognized the ministerial exception, the Court then de-
termined whether it applied in this case.125  Again, the Court
agreed with the court of appeals and held that "the ministerial
117. Id. at 699.
118. Id. at 702.
119. Id. (citations omitted).
120. Id. (citation omitted).
121. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 703 (citation omitted).
122. Id. at 705-06.
123. Id. at 706 (citation omitted).
124. Id. at 706
125. Id. at 707.
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exception is not limited to the head of a religious congregation,"
but refused to adopt a test for determining when an employee
qualifies as a minister.126 Instead, the Court concluded that the
exception covers Perich because, given all of the circumstances of
her employment, she was, in fact, a minister. '27
The Court offered four factual reasons why Perich qualified as a
minister.12 First, the Court focused on the fact that "Hosanna-
Tabor held Perich out as a minister."'29 The Court provided that
the church issued her a "diploma of vocation," according to her
title "Minister of Religion, Commissioned," and tasked her with
performing that office "'according to the Word of God and the con-
fessional standards of the Evangelical Lutheran Church as drawn
from the Sacred Scriptures.'"" The Court also found it significant
that the church periodically reviewed Perich's "skills of ministry"
and "ministerial responsibilities" and provided for her to continue
in her education as a professional person in the ministry of the
Gospel.13'
Next, the Court found that "Perich's title as a minister reflected
a significant degree of religious training followed by a formal pro-
cess of commissioning."'32 The Court noted that, after she com-
pleted her training, she was commissioned as a minister by the
congregation, "which recognized God's call to her to teach."'33 Her
call could only be rescinded by a supermajority vote of the congre-
gation, which, as the Court explained, offered her protection to
"preach the Word of God boldly."134
The Court then focused on Perich and found that she held her-
self out as a minister by accepting the formal call to religious ser-
vice and by claiming special housing allowances on her taxes,
available only to employees who exercise ministry. 3 ' Lastly, the
Court determined that Perich's job duties provided further sup-
port that she qualified as a minister.'36
126. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 707-08.
129. Id. at 707.
130. Id. (citation omitted).
131. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707 (citations omitted).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 708.
135. Id.
136. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708.
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The Court enumerated three errors committed by the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.137 First, the Court stated that the
lower court erred by failing to see any relevance in the fact that
Perich was a commissioned minister."'8 Second, the Court provid-
ed that the Sixth Circuit gave too much weight to the fact that lay
teachers and called teachers perform the same duties.139 Third,
the Court found that the Sixth Circuit placed too much emphasis
on the fact that Perich performed secular duties along with her
religious ones. 40 The Court noted that this position is unfounded,
because even heads of congregations often perform a mix of reli-
gious and secular duties.'
The Court scolded the Sixth Circuit for using a quantity over
quality approach to analyzing Perich's employment duties. 42 The
Court noted that the question of whether Perich qualifies as a
minister is "not one that can be resolved by a stopwatch."143 The
Court further explained that amount of time an employee spends
on a particular activity is relevant, but not dispositive.'"
Ultimately, the Court held that the ministerial exception bars
an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister
challenging her church's decision to fire her. 4' The Court noted
that this holding was limited to this specific case and that "there
would be time enough to address the applicability of the exception
to other circumstances if and when they arise. " "' The Court re-
versed the Sixth Circuit and dismissed Perich's suit.'47
D. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Justice Thomas wrote separately to suggest that "the Religion
Clauses require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and
to defer to a religious organization's good-faith understanding of




140. Id. at 708-09.
141. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 709.
145. Id. at 710.
146. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
147. Id. at 709-10. Implicit in the decision is the Court's treatment of the ministerial
exception as an affirmative defense, in that the Court ordered that the cause of action be
dismissed.
148. Id. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Fall 2012
Duquesne Law Review
who qualifies as a minister is religious in nature, and judicial at-
tempts to fashion a test to determine who qualifies as a minister
risks violating the religion clauses.149 Justice Thomas ended by
stating that the fact that Hosanna-Tabor considered Perich as a
minister would be sufficient to conclude that the ministerial ex-
ception bars the lawsuit.5 °
E. Justice Alito's Concurrence (Joined by Justice Kagan)
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Kagan joined, agreed with the
majority, but wrote separately to clarify that the concept of formal
ordination and that the title of "minister" should not be central to
the issue of determining whether the ministerial exception covers
an employee.' He noted that not all religions ordain their lead-
ers or use the term minister.'52 Instead, Justice Alito suggested
that courts focus on the function performed by the employee and
apply the ministerial exception to any employee who leads a reli-
gious organization, conducts worship services or ceremonies, or
serves as a messenger or teacher of the faith.'53 He provided that,
if a religious group believes that the employee performs these key
functions, then the ministerial exception applies.'54
VI. ANALYSIS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S DECISION-WAS THE
SUPREME COURT THE SAVIOR RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS WERE
SEEKING?
Many hail the Supreme Court's decision in Hosanna-Tabor as a
major win for religious freedom.' While the decision clearly indi-
cates that the religion clauses of the First Amendment protect
churches' religious freedom to hire and fire their ministerial em-
ployees by forbidding governments from second-guessing religious
communities' decisions about who should be their teachers, lead-
149. Id. at 711.
150. Id.
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ers, and ministers, the Court played it safe by limiting its holding
to the facts presented in this particular case.156
The Court's analysis will be perfect if all future employment
discrimination lawsuits brought against a religious organization
involve an employee with the same job functions as Cheryl Perich.
In reality, that will not happen. Inevitably, lower courts will be
faced with determining whether a certain employee, other than a
minister, qualifies for purposes of applying the ministerial excep-
tion. The Hosanna-Tabor decision, however, does not provide the
guidance needed to determine this issue. Therefore, courts may
have no choice but to resurrect the primary duties test.
A. Is the Primary Duties Test Alive and Well?
The million-dollar question remains-who is a minister? The
Hosanna-Tabor Court avoided answering this question by simply
stating that Perich is one.157 The decision, therefore, does not
clearly delineate how a court determines who is, and who is not, a
minister. This lack of a bright-line test offers limited guidance for
lower courts faced with employment discrimination lawsuits
brought by employees of religious organizations who do not have
such clear-cut ministerial duties.
By leaving the door open, the Supreme Court did not completely
foreclose the possibility that religious organizations will be liable
for employment decisions, because the Court limited its holding to
just ministers. Nor did the Court end any future judicial inquiry
into an employee's spiritual significance within the church, be-
cause the Court did not adopt or reject any type of test to deter-
mine who is a minister. The Court's decision, therefore, does not
completely forbid a lower court from using a test that has already
been widely accepted. This leaves another question unanswered-
is the primary duties test alive and well?
The Court did not even mention the primary duties test, but it
did make some important points that make it seem as if it dis-
dains its application. For instance, the Court mentioned that the
amount of time spent by an employee on particular activities is
relevant to whether or not the ministerial exception applies, but
that factor is not dispositive 1 8 This may eliminate the possibility
of a quantity over quality approach to the primary duties test.
156. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
157. Id. at 707.
158. Id. at 709.
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Also, the Court explained that the ministerial exception is not lim-
ited to those employees who perform exclusively religious func-
tions. 5 9 In fact, the Court points out that those employees may
not even exist. ' ° As a result, employees with secular duties may
still fall under the ministerial exception, eliminating the possibil-
ity of a quality over quantity approach to the primary duties test.
Because the Supreme Court did not renounce the primary du-
ties test, the possibility remains that lower courts will apply it in
certain situations to determine if an employee is covered by the
ministerial exception. Before doing so, however, these courts
should be forewarned of the possible dangers lurking in applying
the test.
B. Dangers of the Primary Duties Test
The primary duties test may seem harmless, as it helps courts
determine who qualifies as a minister. This test, however, is a
wolf in sheep's clothing, because it threatens our religious free-
doms. Application of the test violates both the Establishment and
the Free Exercise Clauses. Because the test raises constitutional
concerns, courts should reject it in the future.
Judicial evaluation of the spiritual importance of an employee's
role in the church leads to an Establishment Clause violation, be-
cause it forces judges to differentiate between religious and secu-
lar activities in order to ascertain the spiritual significance of the
activities. As the Supreme Court has previously warned, "[tihe
prospect of church and state litigating in court about what does or
does not have religious meaning touches the very core of the con-
stitutional guarantee against religious establishment."' 1
Additionally, application of the primary duties test violates
churches' Free Exercise rights, because it prevents churches from
choosing spiritual leaders on their own terms. Judges are not
equipped to assess the spiritual significance of an employee. This
leads to inconsistent results as to which employees are deemed
spiritual and which are not.162 If a church is unable to ascertain if
it will be liable under antidiscrimination laws, it may choose em-
159. Id. at 708-09 (citation omitted).
160. Id.
161. New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977) (citation omitted).
162. Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 166 F.3d 1208 (4th
Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (finding that a parochial school teacher was a ministerial employ-
ee). But see Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701-02(citation omitted) (finding that a parochial
school teacher was not a ministerial employee).
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ployees to serve in ministerial positions with an eye on litigation
rather than religion.'63 This infringes on churches' right to exer-
cise religion freely.
Courts also violate the Free Exercise Clause when evaluating
an employee's job functions to determine ministerial status. By
applying the primary duties test, judges determine what job func-
tions are religious as opposed to secular. Based on these determi-
nations, an employee is deemed significant to the religion. Judges
may determine that an employee is not contributing to the spir-
itual mission of a church, even though that church considers the
employee to serve an important spiritual function. As a result,
application of the primary duties test impinges on free exercise
rights by replacing the church's judgment of spirituality with a
secular view."6
No matter how courts apply it, the primary duties test violates
both religion clauses. In the future, courts should, therefore, avoid
the using the test altogether.
C. A New Approach-Deferential Hands-Off Approach
If courts are to abandon the primary duties test, then how are
they to determine who is a minister? In answering this question,
courts should look to Justice Thomas's concurrence in Hosanna-
Tabor when assessing whether the ministerial exception covers an
employee. At the heart of the concurrence, Justice Thomas sug-
gests that courts defer to a religious organization's good-faith
characterization of whether an employee contributes to the spir-
itual mission of the church.'65 The justice explains that churches'
right to choose who will minister would be "hollow" if courts could
substitute secular judgment for religious tenets.
6
Courts should thus take a hands-off approach and defer to the
religious organizations' sincere determination that an employee is
significant to the spiritual mission. As Justice Thomas points out,
163. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th
Cir. 1985) ("There is the danger that churches, wary of EEOC or judicial review of their
decisions, might make them with an eye to avoiding litigation or bureaucratic entangle-
ment rather than upon the basis of their own personal and doctrinal assessments of who
would best serve the pastoral needs of their members.").
164. See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1170 ("It is axiomatic that the guidance of the state can-
not substitute that of the Holy Spirit .. ").
165. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he Religion Clauses
require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to a religious organiza-




whether someone is ministerial or not is religious in nature, and
recognition of an individual's spiritual significance could vary be-
tween churches. Judicial attempts to determine who contributes
to the religion by scrutinizing the employee's functions risks dis-
advantaging some religious organizations whose beliefs are not
"mainstream."167 In addition, with so many religions worldwide, it
is impossible for courts to know and understand every religion's
beliefs and practices. A religion's practice may seem odd or im-
practical to someone who is not part of that particular church. For
example, one may not understand the significance of baptism.
Jehovah Witnesses, however, believe that all baptized members
are disciples. 6 It may be hard for outsiders to believe that all
members of a church are ministerial, but if a church considers
them so, then it is not the place of the judiciary to second guess
the organization's determination.
Of course, a line needs to be drawn as to the amount of leeway
given to churches. Churches are not above the law and should not
be able to claim the ministerial exception for every employee who
receives a paycheck, like custodial or administrative positions,
without some sort of justification, such as through scripture, be-
lief, or ideology. If this is the case, courts should not be able to
second guess the religious organizations' beliefs. For example, if a
church claims that menial job functions, such as cutting grass or
cleaning floors, is significant to the spiritual mission by pointing
to a religious belief, a court should not be permitted to question
the sincerity of that claim. 69 Likewise, if a church claims that,
according to its doctrine, every employee plays a vital role to the
central mission of the religion, courts should not be able to ques-
tion why and how. However, if a church cannot assert any such
reason, then the church should not be able to claim that the em-
ployee fails under the ministerial exception.
While eradicating discrimination in employment is an im-
portant interest in society, protecting churches' constitutional
right to choose who will guide its mission is equally, if not more,
important. Determining who is important to that mission is no
place for the judiciary. Courts should, therefore, make one deter-
mination: whether or not a church is making a hiring and firing
167. Id. at 711.
168. Id.at 714n.4.
169. See Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential Primary
Duties Test, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1794 (2008).
916 Vol. 50
Ministerial Exception
decision within the church. If so, the Court should stop there and
give deference to the church's pronouncement.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Hosanna-Tabor is a landmark
decision, in that the Court sanctifies the ministerial exception and
applies it when a minister who is terminated sues his or her
church, alleging discrimination. However, the decision is not a
complete victory for religious freedom, because it is limited to
when the employee is, in fact, a minister. If the employee's minis-
terial status is debatable, the Hosanna-Tabor decision offers little
guidance as to how lower courts should proceed. This leaves the
door open for courts to continue to violate the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause by applying the primary du-
ties test to assess the spiritual significance of an employee's du-
ties.
Because questions are still unanswered and lower courts are left
guessing as to how to decide who is a minister, the Hosanna-Tabor
case may not have been the major win that religious groups were
looking for. The deferential approach, however, could be the sav-
ior in which these groups can put their faith. Once courts decide
to abandon the primary duties test and defer to religious organiza-
tions' understanding of who is a minister, then churches can de-
clare a victory and be free to choose who will spread the mission of
their religion without the threat of government intrusion.
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